

PEARSON, J.

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT  
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO  
EASTERN DIVISION

DASHAWN PARKER, aka	)	
DAYSHAWN PARKER, aka	)	CASE NO. 4:18cv1744
DASHAUN PARKER	)	
	)	
Plaintiff,	)	JUDGE BENITA Y. PEARSON
	)	
v.	)	
	)	<b><u>MEMORANDUM OF OPINION</u></b>
RICHARD BOWEN,	)	<b><u>AND ORDER</u></b>
	)	
Defendant.	)	

*Pro se* Plaintiff Dashawn Parker filed this action under [42 U.S.C. § 1983](#) against Ohio State Penitentiary Warden Richard Bowen. In the Complaint, Plaintiff alleges she is a transgender inmate who identifies and presents as a female. She requests hormone therapy, surgical implants, and gender reassignment surgery. She states, without elaboration, that prison authorities have denied treatment in violation of the Eighth Amendment. She seeks monetary damages and the treatment she requested.

### I. Standard for Dismissal

Although *pro se* pleadings are liberally construed, [Boag v. MacDougall](#), 454 U.S. 364, 365 (1982) (per curiam); [Haines v. Kerner](#), 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972), the Court is required to dismiss an *in forma pauperis* action under [28 U.S.C. § 1915\(e\)](#) if it fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, or if it lacks an arguable basis in law or fact. [Neitzke v. Williams](#), 490 U.S. 319 (1989); [Lawler v. Marshall](#), 898 F.2d 1196 (6th Cir. 1990); [Sistrunk v. City of](#)

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Strongsville, 99 F.3d 194, 197 (6th Cir. 1996). An action has no arguable basis in law when a defendant is immune from suit or when a plaintiff claims a violation of a legal interest which clearly does not exist. Neitzke, 490 U.S. at 327. An action has no arguable factual basis when the allegations are “delusional” or rise to the level of the irrational or “wholly incredible.” Denton v. Hernandez, 504 U.S. 25, 32 (1992); Lawler, 898 F.2d at 1199.

When determining whether the Plaintiff has stated a claim upon which relief can be granted, the Court must construe the Complaint in the light most favorable to the Plaintiff, accept all factual allegations as true, and determine whether the Complaint contains “enough fact to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007). The Plaintiff’s obligation to provide the grounds for relief “requires more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do.” Id. Although a Complaint need not contain detailed factual allegations, its “factual allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level on the assumption that all the allegations in the Complaint are true.” Id. The Court is “not bound to accept as true a legal conclusion couched as a factual allegation.” Papasan v. Allain, 478 U.S. 265, 286 (1986). The Supreme Court in Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 677-78 (2009), further explains the “plausibility” requirement, stating that “a claim has facial plausibility when the Plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. “[T]he plausibility standard is not akin to a ‘probability requirement,’ but it asks for more than a sheer possibility that a defendant acted

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unlawfully.” [\*Id.\*](#) This determination is a “context-specific task that requires the reviewing court to draw on its judicial experience and common sense.” [\*Id.\*](#)

## II. Law and Analysis

The Eighth Amendment imposes a constitutional limitation on the power of the states to punish those convicted of crimes. Punishment may not be “barbarous,” nor may it contravene society’s “evolving standards of decency.” [\*Rhodes v. Chapman\*, 452 U.S. 337, 346 \(1981\)](#). The Eighth Amendment protects inmates by requiring that “prison officials . . . ensure that inmates receive adequate food, clothing, shelter, and medical care, and . . . ‘take reasonable measures to guarantee the safety of the inmates.’ ” [\*Id.\* at 832](#) (quoting [\*Hudson v. Palmer\*, 468 U.S. 517, 526-27 \(1984\)](#)). This, however, does not mandate that a prisoner be free from discomfort or inconvenience during his or her incarceration. [\*Ivey v. Wilson\*, 832 F.2d 950, 954 \(6th Cir. 1987\)](#) (per curiam) (quoting [\*Rhodes\*, 452 U.S. at 346](#)). Prisoners are not entitled to unfettered access to the medical treatment of their choice, see [\*Hudson v. McMillian\*, 503 U.S. 1, 9 \(1992\)](#), nor can they “expect the amenities, conveniences and services of a good hotel.” [\*Harris v. Fleming\*, 839 F.2d 1232, 1235 \(7th Cir. 1988\)](#); see [\*Thaddeus-X v. Blatter\*, 175 F.3d 378, 405 \(6th Cir. 1999\)](#). In sum, the Eighth Amendment affords the constitutional minimum protection against conditions of confinement which constitute health threats, but it does not address those conditions which cause the prisoner to feel merely uncomfortable or which cause aggravation or annoyance. [\*Hudson\*, 503 U.S. at 9-10](#) (requiring extreme or grave deprivation).

The Supreme Court in [\*Wilson v. Seiter\*, 501 U.S. 294, 298 \(1991\)](#), set forth a framework for courts to use when deciding whether certain conditions of confinement constitute cruel and

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unusual punishment prohibited by the Eighth Amendment. Plaintiff must first plead facts which, if true, establish that a sufficiently serious deprivation has occurred. *Id.* Seriousness is measured in response to “contemporary standards of decency.” [\*Hudson v. McMillian\*, 503 U.S. 1, 8 \(1992\)](#). Routine discomforts of prison life do not suffice. *Id.* Only deliberate indifference to serious medical needs or extreme deprivations regarding the conditions of confinement will implicate the protections of the Eighth Amendment. [\*Id.\* at 9](#). Plaintiff must also establish a subjective element showing the prison officials acted with a sufficiently culpable state of mind. *Id.* Deliberate indifference is characterized by obduracy or wantonness, not inadvertence or good faith error. [\*Whitley v. Albers\*, 475 U.S. 312, 319 \(1986\)](#). Liability cannot be predicated solely on negligence. *Id.* A prison official violates the Eighth Amendment only when both the objective and subjective requirements are met. [\*Farmer v. Brennan\*, 511 U.S. 825, 834 \(1994\)](#).

Gender dysphoria has been recognized as a serious medical need by some courts. *See, e.g.,* [\*Murray v. U.S. Bureau of Prisons\*, No. 95-5204, 1997 WL 34677, at \\*3 \(6th Cir. Jan. 28, 1997\)](#); [\*Miller v. Stevenson\*, No. 1:18-CV-702, 2018 WL 3722164, at \\*5 \(W.D. Mich. Aug. 6, 2018\)](#) (“Since transsexualism is a recognized medical disorder, and transsexuals often have a serious medical need for some sort of treatment, a complete refusal by prison officials to provide a transsexual with any treatment at all would state an Eighth Amendment claim for deliberate indifference to medical needs.”). Plaintiff, however, cannot satisfy the subjective component of an Eighth Amendment claim because she does not allege sufficient facts to suggest this Defendant was deliberately indifferent to her serious medical needs. An official acts with deliberate indifference if “the official knows of and disregards an excessive risk to inmate health

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or safety.” [Farmer, 511 U.S. at 834](#). “[T]he official must both be aware of facts from which the inference could be drawn that a substantial risk of serious harm exists, and he must also draw the inference.” [Id.](#) Plaintiff does not allege any facts pertaining to the Warden. There is no suggestion in the Complaint that the Warden was aware of Plaintiff’s medical issues or that he was personally involved in any decision to deny treatment.

### **III. Conclusion**

Accordingly, this action is dismissed without prejudice pursuant to [28 U.S.C. § 1915\(e\)](#). The Court certifies, pursuant to [28 U.S.C. § 1915\(a\)\(3\)](#), that an appeal from this decision could not be taken in good faith.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

November 30, 2018  
Date

/s/ Benita Y. Pearson  
Benita Y. Pearson  
United States District Judge